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Abstract—With the emerging of touch-less human-computer
interaction techniques and gadgets, mid-air hand gestures have
been widely used for authentication. Much literature examined
either the usability or security of a handful of gestures. This
paper aims at quantifying usability and security of gestures
as well as understanding their relationship across multiple
gestures. To study gesture-based authentication, we design an
authentication method that combines Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) and Support Vector Machine (SVM), and conducted a
user study with 42 participants over a period of 6 weeks. We
objectively quantify the usability of a gesture by the number of
corners and the frame length of all gesture samples, quantify the
security using the equal error rate (EER), and the consistency
by EER over a period of time. Meanwhile, we obtain subjective
evaluation of usability and security by conducting a survey. By
examining the responses, we found that the subjective evaluation
confirms with the objective ones, and usability is in inverse
relationship with security. We studied the consistency of gestures
and found that most participants forgot gestures to some degree
and reinforcing the memorization of gestures is necessary to
improve the authentication performance. Finally, we performed
a study with another 17 participants on shoulder surfing attacks,
where attackers can observe the victims multiple times. The
results show that shoulder surfing does not help to boost the
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of various gesture capturing devices (e.g.,
touch screen and depth sensors) has enabled user-friendly
ways to operate computers as well as to authenticate users.
Essentially, such gesture-based authentication is behavioral
biometrics. Compared with traditional methods (e.g., pass-
words, tokens, or physiological biometrics), gesture-based
authentication has several advantages and is believed to be
resistance to shoulder surfing, password thieves, or token
loss. Not surprisingly, much work has been devoted into
gesture-based authentication, and researchers have studied
both contact-based and mid-air gestures. The contact-based
gestures are harvested while users touch I/O devices phys-
ically. In comparison, mid-air gestures require no physical
contact of devices, and thus can eliminate smudge attacks [1],
avoid bacteria propagation, and allow scenarios where touch
is impossible (e.g., in a clean room [2]). In light of these
advantages, in this paper, we investigate the security and
usability of mid-air gestures.
Already, researchers have proposed and studied various mid-
air gestures for authentication, which, to name a few, include
signature gestures captured by a Leap Motion controller [3],
two ‘upward’ hand movements [4], simple gestures, such
as drawing shapes, symbols, digits, etc., captured by a web
Fig. 1. Illustration of using various gestures as authentication inputs. Left
picture shows waving with multiple fingers and right picture shows writing a
You with one finger.
camera with a short range depth sensor [5]. These works
provide insights towards designing gestures for authentication.
However, they either focused only on the security of mid-
air gestures or performed preliminary user study on a limited
number of gestures over a short period.
It is so far unclear, does a complicated gesture always map
to a higher level of security? Will a complicated gesture en-
compass larger variance and cause inconsistency in identifying
a user? Does a complicated gesture represent poor usability,
e.g., it takes long time to perform and is difficult to remember?
Does gesture-based authentication share the same dilemma of
passwords: what is secure is difficult to remember? Given a
gesture, can we provide quick feedback on its security level
and thus assist in choosing a better gesture? This paper aims
at answering these questions. In particular, we first selected a
collection of representative mid-air gestures and user-defined
gestures with the goal of exploring the trade-off between
usability and security. We quantify security and usability of
each gesture by using both objective metrics that are calculated
based on gesture samples and subjective metrics derived from
a survey. Using the gesture samples collected by 42 users
over 6 weeks and the survey responded by them, we managed
to show that the quantitative metrics match with subjective
perception of users and thus can be used to quantify the
security and usability of gestures. Since we discovered that
the usability and security are in inverse relationship, we can
use the quantitative metrics of usability, i.e., the number of
corners and the length of a gesture, to quantify the security
of the gestures and provide quick feedback of a gesture. We
summarize our contributions as below.
• We proposed a set of metrics to quantify the usability and
security of a gesture, which include objective metrics that
are calculated based on gesture samples and subjective
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2metrics derived from a survey.
• We proposed an authentication method that combines a
template-based method (DTW) and a machine-learning
based classifier (SVM). The combined method can handle
large spatial-temporal variations of a gesture by using a
small number of training samples.
• We conducted two studies to quantify the gesture’s secu-
rity and usability: an objective evaluation by authenticat-
ing gesture samples collected over 6 weeks and a subjec-
tive evaluation by gathering well-designed questionnaires
from users.
• Our studies indicate that usability and security are in
inverse relationship and thus we can utilize simple metrics
(the number of corners and frames) to quantify the
security of a gesture for quick feedback. In addition, our
study suggests that repeated performing a gesture can
improve users’ perception of usability and help improve
the consistency of gestures.
• Our study on shoulder surfing shows that hand gestures
are hard to mimic and shoulder surfing attack is not a
main thread to our authentication system.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we overview our problem definition and
define metrics to quantify security, usability, as well as con-
sistency.
A. Problem
Numerous gestures have been proposed to authenticate
users, yet little has been done to compare their performance
in terms of security and usability. This paper aims at filling in
the blank by quantifying the security and usability of different
mid-air gestures. We quantify security and usability of each
gesture by using both objective metrics that are calculated
based on gesture samples and subjective metrics derived from
a survey. In particular, this paper tries to answer the following
questions.
• Security question: Given a set of gestures, which gesture
maps to the best security level, i.e., it yields the best
accuracy of authentication?
• Usability question: Given a set of gestures, which one
is the easiest to use and the most acceptable to users?
How to quantify the usability purely using the statistics
of gestures?
• Security vs. Usability: What is the relationship between
security and usability when using mid-air gestures for
authentication? Does gesture-based authentication share
the same dilemma of passwords: secure gestures are more
difficult to be remembered?
B. Security
In the context of gesture-based authentication, we define
security from the aspects of distinctness and resilience to
attacks — i.e., shoulder surfing attack. A secure gesture
should contain distinct biometric information that suffices
user authentication, i.e., even if two users perform the same
gestures, their gesture samples should be distinguishable. In
addition, a secure gesture should be resilient to attacks. Since
much work claims that mid-air gestures are robust against
should surfing attacks without validation, we focus on such
attack.
Metrics. we use Equal Error Rate (EER), which is the value
where the false rejection rate equals to the false acceptance
rate, to quantify distinctness. In addition, we obtain users’
subjective perception of security by conducting a user survey.
Details are discussed in Section V-A.
We use precision and recall to analyze the performance
of each gesture password for defending against shoulder
surfing attack. Precision is the percentage of honest users
out of all the users that have passed verification, and it
describes how cautious the system is to accept a user. Formally,
Precision =
∑m
i=1 tpi∑m
i=1 tpi+
∑m
i=1 fpi
. Recall is the percentage of
the honest users that have been granted access out of all
honest users, and it affects the user experience. Formally,
Recall =
∑m
i=1 tpi∑m
i=1 tpi+
∑m
i=1 fni
.
C. Usability
Motivated by the standard ISO 9241-11 [6], we define the
usability of a gesture by considering its efficiency, satisfaction,
and learnability. Efficiency describes the resources required
from users for successful authentication. Satisfaction reflects
the comfort and acceptability of using the gesture, and learn-
ability is defined by the “time of learning”, i.e., how easy is it
for users to pass the gesture-based authentication at their first
attempt [7]?
Metrics. To objectively quantify the efficiency and satisfac-
tion of a gesture, we calculate the average length of the gesture
samples (i.e., how long does a user perform the gesture) and
the average number of corners in the gesture samples (i.e., the
number of sharp turning points in the gesture). Intuitively, the
longer it takes to perform a gesture or the more corners in a
gesture, the less convenient the user feels and the poorer the
usability. In addition, usability is subject to how users perceive.
Thus, we also conducted a comprehensive user survey on the
usability of each gesture. Details are discussed in Section V-B.
D. Consistency
Consistency (aka. memorability) can affect both security
and usability, and thus we study consistency by itself. An ideal
gesture should be consistent over time with little memorization
requirements: when users return for authentication after a
period of time since the last try, they can still provide gestures
that contain the same biometric information as the ones that
were initially enrolled for authenticating them. The more
consistency, the better security performance and the less effort
to pass authentication.
Metrics. We quantified consistency from three aspects:
(a) the variances of each gesture over time (i.e., the frame
number and corner number ) (b) the EER of the gesture
samples over a period of time (in our case, 6 weeks) .
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
We design an authentication system based on a Leap Motion
controller, which is a 3D motion sensor and can track the
motion of human hands as well as all ten fingers in the
3D space. We define a gesture sample as one measurement
3TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF THE SELECTED GESTURES. EACH COLOR
CORRESPONDS TO THE TRAJECTORY OF ONE FINGER.
Swipe Wave
Circle Zoom
Grab ‘abc’ User-defined Sig
that contains a complete gesture, i.e., N frames reported by
Leap Motion. We develop a program written in Java that
integrated Leap Motion’s SDK 2.0v [8] for collecting gestures.
After collecting the gesture data, we build a classifier which
combines two algorithms (DTW and SVM) to distinguish
users.
In this section, we introduce the candidate gestures, feature
selection and the classifier of our authentication systems.
A. Gesture Selection
Many types of gestures have been studied in prior work,
either in the context of gesture recognition or user authen-
tication. These gestures include but not limited to swipe,
zoom in/out, pan and scroll, point, and rotate either on touch
screens or in the air [9]–[11]; mid-air wave [12]; mid-air
signatures [13], etc. Covering every possible type of gestures
is difficult, and thus we select a few popular gestures that
are used for operating computing system and controlling
home appliances (e.g., smart TVs) and/or have been studied
specific for authentication, i.e., Swipe, Wave, Zoom and
Grab and choose drawing gesture Circle, writing gesture
‘abc’ and user-defined signatures (Sig) as they are studied
for authentication purpose. Finally, we let each user define
a gesture to reflect his/her preferences that are not included
in the aforementioned gestures, we call it User-defined
gesture.
In total, we select six pre-defined gestures and two user-
defined gestures. We illustrate all gestures in Table I.
Pre-Defined Gestures
1) Swipe. Users intentionally swipe his or her hand from
one position to another position, and we define Swipe as a
one way movement. Nowadays, swiping touch screens is a
popular way to turn pages.
2) Wave. Users naturally wave their hand. We choose this
gesture because we believe it is easy to perform and might lead
to promising usability. Table I illustrates two ways to wave:
move up and down (i.e., mimicking ocean waves), or wave
back and forth between left and right (i.e., waving hands to
represent Hello or goodbye).
3) Zoom. Gestures Zoom in or out require to engage
at least two fingers: Zoom either gathers finger-tips toward
palm center or spreads out the finger-tips. Both gestures are
commonly used for touch screen for changing the font size,
showing/hiding a window, etc. We study Zoom in the context
of 3D space.
4) Circle. Gesture Circle maps to the hand movement
of drawing a circle when all five fingers are stretched out and
towards the computer screen. The movement can be preformed
clockwise or counter clockwise, and consists of one circle or
multiple circles.
5) Grab. Gesture Grab is a quick, sudden clutch, starting
with all fingers spread and ending at a fist.
6) ‘abc’. Gesture ‘abc’ is the hand movement of writing
a string ‘abc’ with five fingers. It is chosen to test the gestures
of writing letters/word.
User-Defined Gestures
1) Sig. We let users sign their initials/first/full names that
might be used for signing documents. Some of our participants
used all five fingers to sign and some of them used only one
finger.
2) User-defined. We let each user to freely make one
gesture that he/she believes to be secure and convenient for
him/her.
B. Authentication Algorithms
Similar to most biometrics based authentication systems,
we utilize supervised classifiers that require training to distin-
guish users. To effectively authenticate a user based on their
mid-air gestures, we design an authentication algorithm that
combines Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [10] and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [14] methods. As a template-based
method, DTW is widely used to quantify similarity between
samples and only requires a small number of templates. It
allows nonrigid warping along the temporal axis and thus can
tolerate differences in timing between gestures, i.e., a user may
perform the same gestures at slower or faster speeds among
trials. SVM is a popular machine learning algorithm that can
handle more complex spatial-temporal variations of the same
gestures at the cost of a large number of training samples. By
combining the DTW and SVM methods, the proposed method
can handle large spatial-temporal variations of a gesture by
using a small number of training samples.
SVM Training and Classification. We train a binary SVM
classifier for each user with T template samples. Specifically,
given a system with M users, to train the SVM classifier for
user i, we take its T template samples as the positive training
samples and the template samples from other users as the
negative training samples, i.e., (M − 1)T samples. For each
training sample, we extract its W -dimensional DTW-based
feature as the input to the SVM classifier, where W = MT .
With the trained M SVM classifiers, we can verify whether
a new gesture sample gtest is indeed performed by a user u
by (a) computing the DTW distance between gtest and all W
template samples to obtain the W -dimensional feature of the
sample gtest, and (b) input this W -dimensional DTW-based
feature to the user u’s SVM classifier. If the output of the
SVM classifier is positive, the authentication of the user u is
succeeded. Otherwise, the authentication is failed.
To enroll a new user, we collect his/her T template samples,
add to the existing template samples, and retrain the SVM
classifiers for all the users. In particular, the dimension of
4TABLE II
FRAME FEATURES FROM LEAP MOTION AND DTW-BASED
GESTURE-SAMPLE FEATURES.
Frame-based Hand:
feature grab strength, and pinch strength,
for DTW pitch, yaw, and roll,
palm width, and x, y, z axis of palm
x, y, z axis of arm and wrist.
Finger:
x, y and z positions of finger-tips,
x, y and z velocities of finger-tips,
x, y and z directions of finger-tips,
angles between consecutive frames.
DTW-based DTW distance to W template samples
feature sample g′s DTW distance to W template samples
for SVM {g11, g12, · · · , g1T , g21, g22, · · · , g2T , · · · , gM1,
gM2, · · · , gMT }
the sample feature will increase by T when a new user is
enrolled, i.e., W = (M + 1)T . Note that it is possible
that users may have various feature dimension of their SVM
classifiers, depending on the sequence of their enrollment. In
the verification stage, given a new gesture sample, we calculate
its features, using which the trained SVM classifier verifies it.
C. Feature Selection
Based on our authentication algorithms, we extract two
levels of features for DTW and SVM, respectively: frame
features and DTW-based features.
Frame Features. A raw data frame of Leap Motion contains
N frames with each frame containing 20 features for a hand
and 11 features for each finger. Frame features consist of
features directly from the raw data and the derived ones.
The hand features include the following: grab strength and
pinch strength, which describe the posture of the hand; pitch,
yaw, and roll, which describe the angles of the hand around
the x−, y−, and z-axes; palm width; (x, y, z) coordinates of
palm, arm, and wrist, respectively; hand type, which indicates
whether it is a left or right hand; 4 flags of gesture types,
i.e., whether it is a circle, a swipe, a key tap, or a screen
tap. The finger features include the (x, y, z) coordinates, the 3
dimensional velocity, and the moving directions of each finger
tip, finger length, and finger width. Combing the features of the
hand and its five fingers, we obtain 75 features on each frame
from the raw data. In addition to these 75 features, on each
frame we generate five new features based on finger features:
the distance between finger tip positions in consecutive frames,
two angles of finger-tip positions between consecutive frames
in x−y plane and x−z planes, one angle in the 3D plane, and
one curvature in the 3D plane [8]. This way, we have 25 new
features over five fingers and in total we obtain 100 features
on each frame.
DTW-Based Features. In the enrollment stage, we collect
T gesture samples for each of the M enrolled anchor
users. This way, we in total have W = T × M template
samples gij , where i indicates user i and j indicates the ith
template samples from each user. Given a gesture sample
g, we extract a W -dimensional sample feature vector by
computing and concatenating its DTW distances against
all the W template samples, by following a fixed order of
TABLE III
BASIC INFORMATION ON DATA COLLECTION.
Data #Participants #Samples Ave. days after
Batch No. excpet UD only 1st collection
1st 32 3400 0
2nd 32 2724 2
3rd 32 2567 5
4th 32 2519 8
5th 31 2352 10
6th 29 1904 12
7th 28 1732 15
8th 28 1693 17
9th 27 1490 24
10th 24 1297 27
11th 14 954 32
12th 13 885 37
13th 13 874 43
{g11, g12, · · · , g1T , g21, g22, · · · , g2T , · · · , gM1, gM2, · · · , gMT }.
This W -dimensional sample feature is then used as the input
to train and test the SVM classifiers.
Feature Reduction. Since the 100 features of each frame
do not contribute equally towards verification, we select a
subset of them to compute the DTW distance with the goal
of maximizing the verification performance. To evaluate each
feature, we use each of these 100 frame features to compute
the DTW-based feature as mentioned above for training the
SVM classifier and evaluating the average EER over all the
users (to be discussed later). We discard the frame features
that produce an EER less than 50%. Eventually, we kept 75
frame features. To further boost the verification performance,
we calculate the weight for each frame feature and use feature
weights for computing the DTW distance between gesture
samples.
IV. DATA ACQUISITION
To quantify the gesture’s security and usability, we recruited
42 volunteers (32 males and 10 females) in two universities.
Among the 42 participants, 40 people are between 18 and
34 years, majority of whom are college students, and 2
participants are between 35 and 54 years. They were asked to
complete gesture collection over 6 weeks and finish a survey in
the end. Among the 42 participants, 32 participants perform all
types of gestures. To mimic the real scenarios where a user
may only need to remember a few User-defined (UD)
gestures, the other 10 users in this group only contribute to
User-defined gestures. When participants perform ges-
tures, we encouraged them to perform in the most comfortable
ways. Each participant was compensated a $20 gift card after
completion the whole experiment.
Table III summarizes the information for each round of data
collection. Each batch denotes that we collect the participants’
gesture data for one time. In the first two weeks, the partic-
ipants came to our lab three times per week and in the third
and forth weeks, twice per week. For the last two weeks, the
participants came to our lab three times in total. The time
elapsed between two consecutive data collections are more
than 24 hours. In total, we collected 13 batches of data around
6 weeks.
Pre-defined Gestures. Most of the pre-defined gestures are
commonly used on touch screens or pad, and users usually
5TABLE IV
QUESTIONS FOR EACH GESTURE IN THE SURVEY.
Question
1 I would like to use this gesture frequently.
2 I found it unnecessarily complex.
3 I thought it was easy to use.
4 I would need training to be able to use it.
5 I found it would be performed smoothly.
6 I think I cannot perform the same gesture every time.
7 I would imagine that most people would learn to use it very quickly.
8 I found it very cumbersome to use.
9 I felt very confident using it.
10 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this
gesture.
11 I can easily remember how to perform this gesture.
12 It is hard for me to recall this gesture after one week.
know how to perform them. Nevertheless, users have their
own preferences of performing gestures. For instance, a user
may wave from left to right, and another user may wave from
top to down.
User-defined Gestures. 1) Gesture User-defined. Par-
ticipants were encouraged to select one gesture that is secure
for authentication and convenient to use. Among the 42
participants, 25 chose letter(s) and number(s). 17 participants
chose to draw simple shapes, such as mathematical symbols,
stars, and the combination of the above shapes or some other
strange shapes.
2) Gesture Sig. For convenience concerns, most partici-
pants did not sign their whole name, but just their initials, first
names, or family names. Among all of them, initials are the
most popular choices, which account for 70%. The average
length (i.e., the number of English letters) of the collected
signatures is 4.4 with a maximum of 8 and minimum of 1.
Survey. After finishing the gesture collection over six
weeks, the participants were asked to answer a survey. The
question answers use a 5-point Likert scale, i.e., 5 choices
ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree. The survey
consists of three parts: (1) Part one asks for participants’ back-
ground information, e.g., gender and age and their preferences
on authentication mechanisms. (2) The second part of the
survey consists of a set of 12 questions (in Table IV) for
each gesture. We modified 10 standard System Usability Scale
(SUS) [15] questions to measure the usability of each gesture,
and added 2 more questions to measure the memorability. (3)
In the end, we asked participants to rate the security level
of each gesture if they are going to use these gestures as
passwords.
V. EVALUATION
We objectively evaluated the security and usability of all the
gestures by analyzing the collected samples, e.g., computing
the number of corners, the number of frames, and the EER of
each gesture. We also subjectively evaluated the security and
usability of all the gestures by conducting a survey from all the
users. In the end, we try to explore the relationship between
usability and security from both objective and subjective
perspectives.
A. Security Evaluation
We discuss distinctness in this section and consistency in
Section VI and shoulder surfing attack in Section VII. In
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Fig. 2. The security performance evaluated by survey responses from all
participants and the EER from the authentication system.
this section, we first summarize the subjective security results
reported by participants and then quantify security objectively
by EER.
1) Results from Survey Responses: The third part of the
survey evaluates each gesture’s security level if it is used as a
password, and the question uses a 5-point Likert scale “Least
secure” - “Most secure”. In Fig. 2, the pink bars show the score
of security estimation derived from the survey responses. We
first count the percentage of participants who chose “Second
secure” and “Most secure”. Then we divided the percentage
values (< 100) by 20 to fit the scale of EER (< 6%), which
are shown in sky blue bars.
From the survey results in Fig. 2, we have the following
observations: (a) Pre-defined simple gestures Wave, Swipe,
Grab, Zoom, and Circle are considered insecure. (b) Ges-
ture ‘abc’ is considered to have the medium security level.
(c) Gestures Sig and User-defined are considered the
most secure authentication gestures.
2) Results from Equal Error Rate: To verify the overall
performance of the system, we tested all the data with five
folds of experiments. For each gesture type and each user, we
randomly divided the data into a training set and a test set,
and the overview performance is the average results of the
multiple rounds experiments. In this experiment, we utilize
the gestures collected in the first round, and we have N
users, and set the number of training samples for each gesture
as T = 4. Therefore, the feature f(g′) for gesture g′ has
N × 4 dimensions. To prepare a DTW-based feature for SVM
classifiers, we need around 15ms to compute features of a
single testing gesture using a laptop with an Intel i7-2.8 GHz
CPU and 8-GB memory.
The sky blue bars in Fig. 2 show the average EER for
each gesture. A smaller EER maps to a higher verification
performance. The results show that:
• The user-defined gesture Sig has the lowest error rate
(0.77%). Even participants may choose the same signa-
ture, the accuracy is still high as participants should have
different writing styles.
• Although we observed that most participants
chose simple movements, the user-defined gestures
User-defined (UD) have error rate 1.01%,
• The gesture ‘abc’ has an error rate of 1.81%. Although
all the participants wrote the same content, we can iden-
tify the owner of each sample. Compared with other pre-
defined gestures, ‘abc’ is more complex and contains
distinct biometric information of participants.
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Fig. 3. The results of participants’ evaluation on both security and usability
on each gesture. ‘100’- best usability/security. ‘0’- worst usability/security.
• Other pre-defined gestures have error rates ranging be-
tween 2% and 6%.
• The subjective security evaluation matches with the ob-
jective EER. The smaller the EER is, the more secure the
authentication is.
B. Evaluation on Usability
In this section, we first evaluate the usability of the authen-
tication system from the survey responses. Then we evaluate
the usability of each gestures from both the subjective aspect
reported by the participants and the objective aspect quantified
by the two metrics.
The collected background information from the survey
shows that the majority (90.5%) of participants would like
to use mid-air gesture for authentication if available, even
including the older participants. The participants’ responses
further show that the reason of the acceptance include con-
venience, ease-to-remember, and security. Only few of them
have concerns on security, worrying that mid-air gestures are
not as accurate as typing a text password.
1) Results from Survey Responses: To evaluate the usability
of each designed gesture, we calculate SUS scores using the
responses of the first 10 questions for each gesture. Note
that the SUS scores are references to compare participants’
opinions among different gestures, i.e., the gesture with a
higher score indicates a higher usability than the gesture
with a lower score. The blue sky colors in Fig. 3 show the
average score of participants for each gesture. We find that
the SUS scores for simple predefined gestures Swipe, Wave,
Circle, Zoom and Grab are close to or greater than 68
(above average), indicating participants are more willing to use
gestures than unwilling [16]. To analyze if different gestures
has significant impact on perceived usability, a Repeated
Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was conducted
using different gestures as independent variables and usability
as the dependent variable. According to the result, there was
not a significant effect of the gesture type on the perceived
usability at the p < 0.05 level for the seven different gestures
[F (6, 175) = 0.69, p = 0.6613], which suggests that the
participants consider all gestures have the similar usability.
2) Results from Gesture Samples: To examine the usability
of gestures from an objective perspective, we inspect the
gesture samples, and calculate the number of corners and the
number of frames.
Number of Corners. We consider the gestures with a larger
number of sharp changes more complex, e.g., the gesture ′w′ is
more complex than the gesture ′o′. Thus, we use the number
(a) Circle (b) Zoom (c) Grab
(d) ‘abc’ (e) UD (f) Sig
Fig. 4. Illustration of corner detection results.
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Fig. 5. The usability evaluated based on SUS scores from all participants,
the number of corners and the number of frames from G-Sample+.
of corners of gesture samples to evaluate their complexity.
We define the corner of a gesture as the turning point with
large curvature value. We use a corner detection algorithm
based on the curvature scale space (CSS) detector [17]. We
evaluate the gesture trajectory from the index finger, because
trajectories from other fingers are similar. Fig. 4 illustrated
an example results of the corner detection. The slate bars
in Fig. 5 illustrate the average number of corners detected
by each gesture type. The gestures Swipe, Wave, Circle,
Zoom and Grab are simple (#corners ≤ 3.4), while the
gestures ‘abc’, User-defined and Sig are complex
(#corners ≥ 7.2).
Number of Frames. We consider the duration of perform-
ing the gesture as a factor to determine whether a gesture
is easy to perform or not. A shorter performing duration
indicates easier to perform. We define the enrolling time as
the number of gesture frames, because the devices’ sample
rate is stable. The average numbers of frames show similar
trends as the number of corners, as shown in Fig. 5 with pink
bars. The simple gestures (Swipe, Wave, Circle, Zoom
and Grab) have #frames ≤ 160, and the rest of gestures
have #frames ≥ 271.
From Fig. 5, we can see the number of corners and the
number of frames exhibit consistent trend. What’s more, they
are in inverse relationship with SUS scores. The only exception
is User-defined. User-defined has similar number of
corners and frames as the ones of Sig, yet User-defined
has a higher usability. We believe it is caused by user pref-
erences: users have the full control in choosing a relatively
complicate gesture yet they feel easy to perform, unlike all
other gestures that are forced upon them.
C. Security vs. Usability
In this section, we explore the relationship between security
and usability based on the survey responses and quantitative
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Fig. 6. The correlation between EER and the number of corners [left] and
the number of frames [right].
metrics.
1) Results from Survey Responses: To compare the sub-
jective evaluation of usability and security, we use the SUS
scores from survey questionnaires as usability metric and use
the security scores that are represented by the percentage
of participants who consider gestures as “Most secure” and
“Second secure” out of five options (i.e., from least secure to
most secure). By scaling all results to the range of 0 to 100, we
show the average scores of each gesture from all participants
in Fig. 3. Higher bars indicate better performance for both us-
ability and security. We observed that the participants consider
the gestures that are easier to perform (e.g., Swipe, Wave,
Grab, Circle, and Zoom) as being less secure, while the
gestures Sig, User-defined and ‘abc’ are considered
more secure but scarified some usability.
2) Results from Quantitative Metrics: We used the average
number of corners and number of frames as evaluation metrics
for usability and EER as a metric for security. To analyze
the trade-off between security and usability, we chose the
linear least square fitting technique to model the relationship
between them. As a result, we obtained fitting lines with
coefficient values r = −0.85 (number of corners v.s. EER)
and r = −0.88 (number of frames v.s. EER), shown in Fig. 6.
All gestures roughly follow the inverse relationship between
usability and security. That is, with the increase of the number
of corners and the increase of gesture length, the security
performance improves.
In addition, the two plots showed the gesture set can be
clustered into two subsets. One subset consists of gestures
‘abc’, User-defined, and Sig (i.e., the 3 dots at bottom-
right area in both subplots of Fig. 6), which have a larger
number of corners and number of frames but lower EER
values. The other subset consists of gestures Swipe, Wave,
Circle, Zoom, and Grab, which have fewer corners and
frames, but higher EER values. The existence of two subsets
indicates the securer gestures generally do not have better
usability in terms of number of corners and gesture length.
VI. CONSISTENCY STUDY
To evaluate the consistency of each gesture, we collected
samples over 6 weeks. Participants came and contributed data
three times per week for the first two weeks, and twice
per week for the next two weeks, and once per week for
the remaining weeks. Most participants finished the entire
experiment. Only two users quit before the end of 6 weeks
due to personal reasons. Table III summarizes the information
of each round of data collection.
2 4 6 8 10 12
100
200
300
400
# Batch of Data
# 
Fr
am
es
 
 
Swipe Wave Circle Zoom Grab abc Sig UD
2 4 6 8 10 120
2
4
6
8
# Batch of Data
# 
Co
rn
er
s
 
 
Swipe Wave Circle Zoom Grab abc Sig UD
Fig. 7. [Top] The average number of frames and [Bottom] the average number
of corners of each batch of data.
A. Consistency from Survey Responses
We asked each participant how likely they could remember
the gesture before each batch of gesture collection, except
the first collection. Note that all participants can remember
how they performed each gesture without any hint at each
batch of gesture collection. For each gesture, the memorability
responses from the survey also indicate that more than 80%
of participants agree that they can recall it. There was no
significant difference among all the gestures.
B. Consistency on Gesture Samples
We examine the consistency of all types of gestures using
the two metrics for quantify usability: the number of frames
and corners. Fig. 7 shows the average number of frames
and corners by gesture types over 10 batches of collection.
Overtime, we observed that participants become increasingly
proficient with each gestures and thus tend to perform gestures
faster and smoother.
C. Consistency on EER
In this section, we use EER to quantify consistency. We
consider the EER values obtained when the training samples
and testing samples belong to the same batch of data as
the baseline. We quantify the changes of two batches of
gesture samples by the difference of two EER (i.e., increase
of EER) values: between the baseline EER and the EER
obtained when using the training samples of one batch and
testing samples from the other. A smaller difference indicates
a better consistency. In particular, we ask two questions: (a)
Will gestures performed over time change? (b) Will the change
of gestures converge over time? To answer these question, we
designed two experiments.
Consistency over Time. To understand whether the change
of gestures is proportional to the gap between performing
gestures, we select batches of samples that were collected in
two consecutive days and in every other days. As we could not
force participants to perform gestures in a tightly-controlled
time schedule, we only managed to find 25 participants
who had contributed data in two consecutive days and 23
participants who had contributed data in every other day. From
the results shown in Fig. 8, we observe that 1) for almost all
gestures, the EER increases as the days go by; 2) the gestures
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Fig. 8. The results of security performance tested by 25 participants one day
later and 23 participants two days later.
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Fig. 9. The EER results averaged over each type of gesture. The experiments
are based on the training templates from the first batch of data.
User-defined, Sig and ‘abc’ have relatively smaller
increases in EER than the other simple gestures.
Convergence of Gesture Changes. To understand whether
the changes across multiple batches will be reduced over time,
we trained SVM classifiers with the samples from the 1st batch
and tested with the ones from the 1st (excluding the training
samples), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th, etc.
The results are shown in Figure 9. We have the following
observations.
• The EER results are low when tested in the same day,
and increase fast at the first gap (two days on average),
then show convergence around the 5th batch (10 days on
average).
• Sig and User-defined exhibit the best security per-
formance (EER < 6% for all batches). The reason
could be that they are complex gestures, and the relative
changes in terms of the number of corners and frames
are smaller than the other gestures.
• ‘abc’ presents relatively better performance than the
rest of simple pre-defined gestures. It is a complex
gesture like Sig but every participant performed the same
gesture, leaving little space to tolerant changes.
• Circle has medium performance. Circle does show
less changes of the number of corners than gesture
Swipe or Zoom.
• Swipe, Grab, Zoom, and Wave have the worst perfor-
mance.
The Number of Gestures to be Remembered. Our
experiments involved two groups of users: 32 participants
that required to remember and perform all gestures and 10
participants that only needed to perform User-defined
gestures. The latter group mimics reality where users choose
a few gestures as passwords. To understand the difference
between two groups, we trained SVM classifiers with the
User-defined samples from the 1st batch and tested with
the ones from the 1st (excluding the training samples), 2nd to
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Fig. 10. The average EER results of User-defined gesture using only
the first batch of data for training. ‘UD only’ shows the average results
of 10 participants. ‘UD+others’ shows the average results of the other 32
participants.
9th batch of data. The results are shown in Fig. 10, from which
we observed that without the burden of remembering other
gestures, the 10 participants can remember the gestures better
and their gestures over time exhibited much better distinctness
and consistency.
VII. SHOULDER SURFING ATTACKS
It is unclear whether mid-air gestures are resilient to shoul-
der surfing attacks. To gain insight of shoulder surfing, We
recruited 13 subjects as victims and another 4 subjects as
attackers, who mimic each type of the gesture performed by
victims. Each victim enrolled 12 samples for each type of the
gestures studied in this paper, and thus 13 × 132 × 8 victim
samples are collected. To mimic shoulder surfing attacks, we
record short videos (e.g., one or two gesture instances) while
victims are performing the gestures.
With the videos, we consider two attack scenarios. In the
first scenario, the attackers are allowed to watch the videos
only once, representing the case that they may happen to see
the victim entering gestures once. Then, the attackers entered
five gestures by mimicking what they saw. Specifically, they
try 5 times for each shown gesture. In total, 4× 5× 8 attack
samples are collected. In the second scenario, the attackers can
watch the videos as many times as they want before or during
the attack. Each attacker attacks X = 10 to 15 times while
learning from a recorded video. In total, we have 4 ×X × 8
attack samples.
To evaluate both attack scenarios, we tested the attack
samples with the classifiers trained with victim samples (used
4 samples for each class). For comparison, we also tested the
classifiers with victim samples which are not used for training.
We use precision recall curves to illustrate the results. By
varying the threshold to reject possible impostors, we obtain
precision recall curves that indicate the trade-off between
security and usability. A higher precision indicates a more
strict threshold (i.e., better security), at the cost of letting
legitimate users try more times. A higher recall indicates a less
strict threshold and may let some attackers pass authentication,
but legitimate users could pass authentication with a less
number of attemps.
The upper-right corner of a curve is the idea point (i.e.,
100% precision and 100% recall – all legitimate users are
authenticated with one attempt, and all the attackers are
rejected). Fig. 11 shows precision recall curves of each gesture
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Fig. 11. precision recall curves under normal (blue) and attack scenarios. In general, the attack with multiple times observation has better performance than
one time observation attacks.
types with different types of test sets: normal samples from
victims (depicted in blue), attack samples with multiple times
of learning (black), attack samples with once observing (red).
Results of all types of gestures show that attack samples with
one or multiple time observation both have low precision,
although multiple learning did slightly improve the chances
of attacks. Nevertheless, the precision and recall are still
relatively low. Thus, the mid-air gestures are difficult to
mimic and the shoulder surfing is not a main thread to our
authentication system.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Gestures, as a new way of human computer interaction,
have shown great promises, and an extensive literature on
gesture recognition exists, which includes multi-touch pinch
gestures [18], 3D gesture recognition using accelerometer and
gyro [19], multi-layer gesture recognition with Kinect [20],
and air gesture identification [21]. These gestures have been
applied to a wide variety of fields, ranging from controling
robots [22], computer commands [23], authentication pur-
poses [24]–[26], game control [27] to VR commands [28].
An increasing number of studies focus on user authenticat-
ing based on behavioral biometrics. Such gestures are embed-
ded in the usage pattern of traditional I/O devices, such as
keystroke dynamics and mouse movement patterns [29], [30].
With the emerge of new technology (e.g., sensors or touch
screens), new gestures were discovered. Lower leg gaits [31]
and hand gesture patterns [31] captured by accelerometers
have shown to achieve high accuracy in user authentication.
The operations on a smartphone/pad’s touch screen (e.g.,
writing a word or using an unlock pattern) can be used
to authenticate users either once during logging in [25] or
continuously thoughout the oepration [32]. The security and
memorability of multi-touch gestures for mobile authentication
have been studied [33]. Unfortunately, touch gestures can be
vulnerable to shoulder surfing or smudge attacks [1].
Mid-air gestures have become a hot topic recently. 3D
hand gesture has been studied on touch-less interactions,
such as augmented reality application and game-based vir-
tual environments [34]–[38]. For authentication purpose,
Nigam et al. combined signature gesture captured by Leap
Motion and facial information by a RGB camera to authen-
ticate a user [3]. Aslan et al. explored two mid-air gestures
for authentication in different situations [4]. AirAuth system
evaluated the security performance with a set of simple hand
gestures captured by a depth sensor Creative Senz3D [5]. Us-
ing Micrsoft Kinect, Hayashi et al. utilized fusion data of hand
waving gesture and user’s body length for authentication [12],
and Tian et al. used a gesture of whiting signatures in the
air [13] for user identification. This paper also investigate mid-
air hand gestures, but focuses on quantifying usability and
security of various gestures and exploring their relationship.
Usability evaluation of authentication schemes for other pur-
poses, e.g. password usage in daily life, Touch-ID on iphone,
Biometric authentication on smartphones, is a well-researched
area [39]–[41]. Usability is crucial for an authentication system
to be adopted by users [42]. Although there are many papers
on mid-air gesture-based authentication, they mostly focus on
improving the accuracy. Only a few literature explored one or
two aspects of usability surrounding gesture-based authentica-
tion: BroAuth [43] present an authentication mechanism based
on body gestures. They evaluate the usability and security
of three types of visual feedback and found that an abstract
representation is the best trade-off between security and us-
ability. Aslan et al. [4] studied 13 participants’ perceptions
on two authentication gestures from the prospective of their
emotions. AirAuth [5] compared participants’ pleasantness
and excitement level between a set of predefined gestures.
They found a positive correlation between the authentication
accuracy and participants’ excitement and pleasantness. This
paper is along the same line, but aims at discovering general
metrics that can quantify both usability and security, and to
understand the relationship between usability and security for
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guiding gesture evaluation.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the usability and security of a collection
of mid-air gestures as biometrics for authentication. Through
a user study that engaged 42 participants to collect gesture
samples 13 times over a 6-week period and a survey, we
managed to validate that the quantitative metrics (i.e., the
number of corners, the sample frame length, and the equal
error rate (EER)) confirms with the subjective scores from the
user survey. Further, we find the correlation between security
and usability metrics, which shows that an easy-to-use gesture
generally has a worse security. Thus, we can utilize the number
of corners and the sample frame length to quickly quantify
the security of a gesture. Finally, our consistency study shows
that participants tend to forget gestures between experiment
rounds.
We note that our experiment results may be different from
reality because samples were collected in a lab environment,
where no serious consequence will be incurred if a user cannot
pass the authentication in our study. We envision that after
gesture-based authentication is widely used, the inconsistency
of gestures over time will become smaller because we have
observed in our study that repeatedly performing gestures will
help to provide consistent gestures.
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